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It has been the mass murder of the events of October 7th, an event that shook global Jewish populations more than any event following the founding of Israel as a nation.

Among Jewish people the event proved deeply traumatic. For Israel as a nation, the situation represented a profound disgrace. The whole Zionist movement was founded on the presumption that Israel would prevent similar tragedies repeating.

Some form of retaliation appeared unavoidable. But the response undertaken by Israel – the widespread destruction of the Gaza Strip, the killing and maiming of many thousands of civilians – represented a decision. And this choice complicated the way numerous American Jews processed the initial assault that precipitated the response, and currently challenges their commemoration of that date. How can someone grieve and remember a tragedy affecting their nation while simultaneously devastation being inflicted upon a different population in your name?

The Complexity of Remembrance

The difficulty surrounding remembrance exists because of the fact that no agreement exists as to what any of this means. In fact, within US Jewish circles, the recent twenty-four months have witnessed the collapse of a fifty-year consensus on Zionism itself.

The beginnings of pro-Israel unity within US Jewish communities can be traced to a 1915 essay written by a legal scholar and then future Supreme Court judge Louis D. Brandeis titled “Jewish Issues; Addressing the Challenge”. But the consensus really takes hold after the 1967 conflict that year. Before then, Jewish Americans maintained a fragile but stable parallel existence across various segments holding diverse perspectives about the requirement for a Jewish nation – pro-Israel advocates, neutral parties and anti-Zionists.

Historical Context

That coexistence persisted through the post-war decades, in remnants of Jewish socialism, in the non-Zionist US Jewish group, within the critical American Council for Judaism and similar institutions. In the view of Louis Finkelstein, the leader of the theological institution, pro-Israel ideology was primarily theological instead of governmental, and he prohibited singing the Israeli national anthem, Hatikvah, at religious school events in those years. Nor were Zionism and pro-Israelism the central focus of Modern Orthodoxy until after that war. Different Jewish identity models coexisted.

However following Israel defeated its neighbors in that war in 1967, seizing land such as Palestinian territories, Gaza Strip, the Golan and Jerusalem's eastern sector, US Jewish connection with the nation evolved considerably. The military success, along with enduring anxieties about another genocide, led to a developing perspective regarding Israel's vital role to the Jewish people, and a source of pride for its strength. Discourse regarding the “miraculous” aspect of the success and the “liberation” of territory assigned Zionism a theological, even messianic, importance. During that enthusiastic period, a significant portion of the remaining ambivalence regarding Zionism disappeared. During the seventies, Commentary magazine editor Norman Podhoretz declared: “Zionism unites us all.”

The Unity and Its Limits

The Zionist consensus excluded strictly Orthodox communities – who generally maintained a Jewish state should only be established via conventional understanding of the Messiah – yet included Reform Judaism, Conservative Judaism, contemporary Orthodox and most secular Jews. The most popular form of the unified position, what became known as progressive Zionism, was founded on a belief in Israel as a progressive and liberal – albeit ethnocentric – country. Many American Jews viewed the administration of Arab, Syria's and Egypt's territories post-1967 as provisional, believing that a solution would soon emerge that would maintain Jewish population majority in Israel proper and regional acceptance of the state.

Multiple generations of US Jews were raised with pro-Israel ideology an essential component of their identity as Jews. The nation became a central part in Jewish learning. Israeli national day became a Jewish holiday. Blue and white banners adorned most synagogues. Summer camps became infused with Israeli songs and education of the language, with Israelis visiting educating American teenagers Israeli culture. Visits to Israel expanded and peaked via educational trips in 1999, when a free trip to the nation was provided to Jewish young adults. The state affected virtually all areas of the American Jewish experience.

Shifting Landscape

Ironically, in these decades after 1967, US Jewish communities became adept at religious pluralism. Open-mindedness and discussion across various Jewish groups increased.

Except when it came to support for Israel – that’s where pluralism ended. You could be a right-leaning advocate or a leftwing Zionist, but support for Israel as a Jewish homeland was assumed, and challenging that position categorized you outside the consensus – a non-conformist, as a Jewish periodical described it in a piece in 2021.

Yet presently, under the weight of the destruction within Gaza, famine, child casualties and frustration regarding the refusal by numerous Jewish individuals who decline to acknowledge their complicity, that unity has broken down. The centrist pro-Israel view {has lost|no longer